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Based on the basic premise of the English School theory of International Relations that great powers have a 
unique responsibility to uphold international peace and security, this chapter examines the ways in which 
China’s notions of great power responsibility guide its policies in the Arctic. Thereby the chapter seeks to 
increase our understanding of what kind of a great power China will be and how its rise may shape the 
discourses, premises and paradigms of international security in the future. Since there seems to be no real risk of 
a military conflict in the Arctic, and since China’s growing engagement is unlikely to induce such a risk, the 
chapter will focus on China’s contribution to the most imminent security risk in the region: climate change. The 
chapter demonstrates that although the Chinese government has started to define climate responsibility as an 
important attribute of great power responsibility at a global level, China’s Arctic policy does not make reference 
to this special responsibility even though climate change generally seems to be one of the key drivers of China’s 
Arctic engagement. Finally, the chapter concludes that because notions of great power responsibility derive from 
the practices of security politics, it is not very likely that China – or the United States – will assume a strong 





Over the last thirty years, international society has been shaped by two significant changes that are likely fuel a 
paradigm shift in international security. In particular, climate change has emerged as a key threat of our times. It 
inevitably poses serious concerns over human security around the world, as it affects the lives of all the people 
on the planet by increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, rising sea levels and changing 
precipitation patterns, for instance. Developing countries – especially the poorest people living in those countries 
– and small island states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are most likely to be harmed by the adverse effects of 
climate change and they do not often have enough resources to adapt to it. In addition, the polar regions are very 
vulnerable to climate change. In the Arctic, temperatures have risen more rapidly than in any other region on 
Earth during the last 30 years. As a result, sea ice, permafrost and the snow cover have decreased dramatically, 
hampering the livelihoods of local people and threatening the survival of many Arctic species such as polar 
bears, walrus and seals (see, for example, Serreze, 2018). Moreover, the melting of ice and permafrost in the 
High North accelerates climate change and alters ecosystems globally (ACIA, 2004; AMAP, 2017). The 
People’s Republic of China (hereafter China or PRC) has undergone a dramatic identity change from an isolated 
communist state to an (emerging) great power that cannot be ignored in any sector of politics or economic life, 
including regional affairs in the Arctic. This identity transformation has significantly transformed its sphere of 
interests and raised global concern about it being a revisionist power seeking to challenge the status quo. Owing 
to China’s growing interest in the Arctic, many regional actors fear that China will challenge the rights and 
interests of the Arctic states and raise the risk of a military conflict in the region (see, for example, Cassotta et 
al., 2015; Rainwater, 2013; Wright, 2011). Instead of directly engaging in this debate, I study the practices of 
international security from another angle by investigating the ways in which China’s notions of great power 
responsibility guide its policies in the Arctic. In this way, I seek to increase our understanding of what kind of a 
great power China will be and how its rise may shape the discourses, premises and paradigms of international 
security in the future.  
 
Consequently, my chapter departs from the work of classic realists, who believe that international relations are 
‘condemned to perpetual great-power competition’ (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 2) and hence the rise of a new great 
power, China, unavoidably causes a hegemonic war. Conversely, I underscore the fact that there is no natural 
law determining the behaviour of rising powers and that their conduct is influenced by circumstances and ideas 
instead. In comparison to previous rising powers, China’s rise takes place in a very different international 
architecture that has brought about new global concerns. On the other hand, China’s cultural-historic 
background, ideologies and values influence its priorities in international relations and its behaviour in different 
situations. I build here on the English School theory of International Relations and start from the fact that a 
central element of being a great power is to have ‘fundamental global capabilities and responsibilities that minor 
or medium powers do not’ (Jackson, 2000, p. 21). According to Shambaugh (2013), whether or not China 
possesses such capabilities and responsibilities at the global level remains to be debated. I argue that we must 
study how China’s rise will change the discourses, premises and paradigms of international security, and why. 
Hence, it is no longer meaningful to discuss whether or not China’s rise to a great power will change the 
practices of international society. In this chapter, I engage in this debate by elaborating China’s policies in the 
Arctic. Since there seems to be no real risk of a military conflict in the Arctic, and since China’s growing 
engagement is unlikely to induce such a risk, I will focus on China’s contribution to the most imminent security 
risk in the region: climate change.  
 
The basic tenet of English School theory is that states form an international society that exists ‘when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions’ (Bull, 2002 [1977], p. 13). In that society, great powers have a special responsibility to 
ensure its workings and to maintain international peace and security. Yet, the classic English School’s focus on 
the security of states is somewhat outdated, as climate change will shape the ways in which security is being 
conceptualised and assessed in the future. In particular, human security, which stresses the protection of human 
beings from both traditional (i.e. military) and non-traditional security threats (such as poverty, pandemic 
diseases and climate change), is likely to become a more important approach to security than ever before. In this 
chapter, therefore, I argue that climate change is a severe security threat that cannot be fully addressed without 
having a paradigm shift in the future international security discourse. In particular, that shift would yield a 
profound normative change in international society: while great powers are generally agreed to have a unique 
responsibility to uphold international peace and security, they would be expected to shoulder the greatest 
responsibility for climate change mitigation and adaptation to it. For China, this responsibility seems to be an 
important justification to engage in Arctic affairs and to strive for a more influential role in the regional 
governance. Therefore, China’s Arctic engagement provides a fruitful case to examine its practices of great 
power responsibility and to analyse their implications for discourses on international security.  
 
Rise of China and great power responsibility  
 
English School theory maintains that power and responsibility go hand in hand: the greater the power of a state 
is, the greater the international effect of its domestic and foreign policies will be on the workings of international 
society and the greater its responsibility will be for the collective well-being of the members of that society. As 
Watson (1982, p. 201) puts it, ‘states with enough power to do serious damage to the functioning of international 
society should accept the responsibility not to cause such damage, but to pursue their interests with prudence and 
restraint’. In 1945, the United Nations (UN) Charter formally appointed great powers to have special 
responsibilities in international society: the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’ (Chapter 5, Article 24). This responsibility was largely based on great powers’ 
material capabilities, because, according to then British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, ‘the more power and 
responsibility can be made to correspond, the more likely it is that the machinery will be able to fulfil its 
functions’ (quoted in Bukovansky et al. 2012, p. 31). In practice, great powers must modify their ‘policies in the 
light of the managerial responsibilities they bear’ in international society (Bull, 2002 [1977], p. 196). As for 
China’s Arctic engagement, this means that China should be cautious not to harm the sovereign rights of Arctic 
states or otherwise undermine the stability in the region, as such action would be inconsistent with its great 
managerial power responsibility.  
 
For Watson as well as for most of the other classic English School theorists, great power responsibility means 
that in a suddenly sharpened conflict, the main responsibility for peace negotiations falls on great powers. In 
cases of unavoidable confrontation between great powers on opposing sides, the responsibility to avoid an 
unnecessary resorting to force belongs to them, rather than the ‘smaller and more immediate protagonists’ 
(Watson, 1982, p. 201). In the post-World War II era, the United States (U.S.) has emphasised human rights and 
humanitarian intervention as key aspects of great power responsibility, since it views liberal norms as an 
important means to sustain the workings of international society (Kopra, 2019a, 2019b). As China is a signatory 
to the international human rights treaties and other key international legal frameworks, it respects liberal norms 
at least in principle without seeking to challenge them. In moral terms, however, China does not accept them as 
guiding principles of international society and instead seems to seek to transform the ways in which great power 
responsibility is conceptualised in the future. In these efforts, the international norms of climate responsibility 
play an important role, as climate change is a truly global phenomenon – not a social construction based on the 
cultural and philosophical traditions of the West (ibid.).   
 
Within the English School, scholars debate on the justifications and scope of great power responsibility: 
pluralists stress the importance of great powers’ role in fostering international order and the security of states, 
whereas solidarists emphasise international justice, human security and the well-being of individuals. Recent 
contributions to English School theory have also paid attention to the environmental responsibilities of states in 
general (Jackson, 2000; Falkner, 2012; Falkner & Buzan, 2018), and those of great powers in particular (Kopra, 
2019a, 2019b). Furthermore, I have argued that climate responsibility is an established international norm, and 
both pluralist and solidarist argumentation can be used to justify great powers’ special responsibility for climate 
change in two respects. First, climate change is a source of potential international conflict, and great powers bear 
the main responsibility for the resolution of the problem owing to their functional great power responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security. Second, climate change causes severe harm to the well-being of 
individual human beings around the world, and great powers should lead global endeavours to solve it because 
of their diplomatic great power responsibility to promote international justice and well-being (Kopra, 2019a, p. 
74).  
 
From the English School standpoint, thus, China’s rise to the status of a great power indicates that we can expect 
it to shoulder more responsibility in international (climate) politics in the future. At the same time, we should 
notice that China might not be willing to carry out such responsibilities if they do not bring along special rights 
in international society as well. In contrast to other states, great powers enjoy privileges in international society: 
they have the capability and legal authority to ‘play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and 
security’ of international society (Bull, 2002 [1977], p.196). This right is written in the UN Charter: permanent 
members of the UN Security Council have a right to decide on the necessary means to maintain international 
peace and security, including the use of military force. Their power of veto in international decision-making 
gives them a hegemonic position in international society and thus grants them a privilege to defend their interests 
or to promote particular issues and ideas in that society, for instance. This privilege makes great powers special 
and establishes an important source of their responsibility in international society (cf. Bukovansky et al.  2012, p. 
31–32). As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a rising great power, China should have 
access to each and every international forum where decisions regarding international peace and security are 
made – otherwise it would be difficult for it to shoulder great power responsibility in practice. In principle, the 
Arctic Council is not such a forum, since issues of international security are not on its agenda. However, the 
situation may change if climate change will be regarded as an international security risk and an important 
attribute of great power responsibility. At present, great powers do not enjoy any privileges in international 
climate politics, because they do not carry special responsibilities, either. 
 
That said, there are indeed signs that climate responsibility is becoming an attribute of great power responsibility 
(Kopra, 2019a, 2019b). After the Cold War, people started to scrutinize the environment and many studies on 
environmentally induced conflicts were conducted (for a detailed overview of these developments, see e.g. 
Trombetta, 2008). In 1992, the UN Security Council acknowledged that the ‘non-military sources of instability 
in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’ (UN 
Security Council, 1992). In the mid-2000s, climate change mitigation was also discussed in the context of 
security politics (Trombetta, 2008, p. 594–595). Since then, the relationship between climate change and violent 
conflicts has been extensively investigated (i.e Lee, 2009; Mazo, 2010; Welzer, 2012). These developments 
induced a debate on the role of the UN Security Council in climate change mitigation: if seen as a risk to 
international peace and security, climate change can and should be added to its agenda (see also Kalliojärvi’s 
chapter in this volume). In 2007, the UN Security Council indeed organised its first discussion on the nexus 
between climate change, energy and international security, although China and some other states insisted that the 
Council was not a proper venue for such debate (United Nations, 2007). Conversely, Margaret Beckett, the 
British Foreign Secretary and President of the Council, argued that the UN Security Council should discuss the 
security impacts of climate change because the ‘Council’s responsibility was [is] the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and climate change exacerbated many threats, including conflict and access to 
energy and food’ (Ibid.). In 2009, the UN General Assembly called upon relevant UN organizations to tighten up 
their climate change mitigation efforts and asked the UN Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report 
on the potential security impacts of climate change (UN General Assembly, 2009a). The Secretary-General 
responded by addressing five topics through which climate change could affect international security: 
vulnerability, development, coping and security, statelessness, and international conflict (UN General Assembly, 
2009b). In 2011, the UN Security Council again discussed climate security under the German presidency. While 
the Council failed to issue a formal resolution on climate change or give specific recommendations on how to 
improve climate security, it issued the first-ever statement on the matter, expressing “its concern that possible 
adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace 
and security” (UN Security Council, 2011). Two years later, informal talks were held on the topic, but because 
of the opposition of China and Russia, climate change was not officially defined as an international security risk 
(Krause-Jackson, 2013). In 2018 and 2019, the Security Council debated the nexus between climate change and 
conflicts again, and the debate is likely to continue in the coming years. Although the UN Security Council has 
not made a formal resolution on climate change, the fact that it has held several talks on the issue indicates that it 
has started to be regarded as a security risk, and hence great powers should bear the special responsibility to 
respond to it (Kopra, 2019b, p. 156). 
 
In rhetoric terms, the United States – at least before the term of Donald J. Trump – and China have 
acknowledged their great power responsibility for climate change. They have stated that their climate 
cooperation establishes a ‘powerful example that can inspire the world’ (White House, 2013). In particular, 
President Barack Obama made an explicit link between climate change and great power status in September 
2014 by announcing that the U.S. and China ‘have a special responsibility to lead’ the global efforts to tackle 
climate change because that is ‘what big nations have to do’ (Obama, 2014). Despite its opposition to hold a 
formal discussion on climate change at the UN Security Council, China seems to have started to accept the idea 
that great powers should lead climate change mitigation and adaptation to the problem at the global level. In 
September 2014, Special Envoy Zhang Gaoli (2014) announced at the UN Climate Summit that ‘responding to 
climate change is what China needs to do to achieve sustainable development at home as well as to fulfil its due 
international obligation as a responsible major country’. After that, China has made all its key climate 
commitments public through joint statements with the United States – a choice which indicates that it has made 
them in reference to its great power status (cf. White House, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b). In November 2016, 
however, the climate change sceptic Donald Trump was elected president, which ended the Sino-American 
leadership in international climate politics. In June 2017, the United States decided to withdrew from the Paris 
Climate Agreement established within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 2015 (White House, 2017). Consequently, international society began to expect China, together 
with the European Union, to step into the shoes of a global climate leader. Chinese President Xi Jinping indeed 
responded to these expectations in October 2017 by announcing that China will take a ‘driving seat’ in 
international climate negotiations (Xi, 2017, p. 4).  
 
At present, however, it remains unclear what kind of a climate leader China will be. It continues to stress the 
historic responsibilities of developed countries and has not indicated a willingness to substantially enhance its 
own, very moderate climate change mitigation pledges to the UNFCCC, which forms the heart of the Paris 
Climate Agreement with its reliance on states’ nationally determined mitigation strategies. Importantly, China 
managed to speed up the implementation of developed countries’ pre-2020 climate actions: as a result of China’s 
diplomatic efforts, the UN conference in 2017 decided that additional stocktaking sessions regarding progress in 
emissions reduction and climate finance be held in the following years. For the future of global efforts to tackle 
climate change, a crucial question is whether China will be using its growing leverage to re-establish the 
bifurcation of developed and developing countries held back by the Paris Agreement or whether it will 
implement ambitiously low carbon development plans that halt its emissions growth as soon as possible and 
inspire the entire international society to implement efficient emissions reductions in time.  
 
China as an Arctic great power 
 
In this section, I discuss the construction of China’s great power status in the context of Arctic affairs. Although 
the concept of great power is very vague and the requirements for its recognition are not crystal clear, it has 
become increasingly evident that China can no longer be excluded from the ‘great power club’ (Bull, 2002 
[1977], p. 194; Wight, 1999 [1946], p. 42; Kopra, 2019a, p. 70–73). The English School conception of great 
power integrates the realist and constructivist perspectives: it assumes that “even if a state reaches a certain level 
of material capacity and has a certain national identity, it does not automatically become a great power, but 
instead needs to be recognised and accepted by other recognised great powers” (Kopra, 2019b, p. 153). As 
discussed above, responsibility is an important attribute of being a great power from the English School theory 
point of view. Therefore, I largely focus on China’s great power identity and its notions of great power 
responsibility in the Arctic and pay less attention to the material aspects of China’s great power status, which 
have been extensively studied elsewhere (see, for example, Brady, 2017). That said, we cannot fully understand 
a state’s identity and beliefs without knowing its (material) interests. In China’s great power status-building, two 
‘centenary goals’1 to be achieved by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, no doubt play a 
central role. Hence, I give a short introduction to China’s interests in the Arctic and discuss how the state’s 
Arctic activities seek to advance the construction of its great power status.    
 
China published its long-awaited white paper entitled China’s Arctic Policy in January 2018 in order to clarify 
its visions and interests regarding the Arctic – thus decreasing the international speculations and various “China 
threat theories” (see Deng, 2008) that its growing regional role has fuelled. The paper sums up China’s Arctic 
policy goals as follows: ‘to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to 
safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote 
sustainable development of the Arctic’ (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2018). For a long time, China’s polar interests were chiefly scientific in nature. It signed the Svalbard 
Treaty in 1925, and Chinese scholars started to conduct research and take part in international research projects 
in the Arctic in the early 1990s. In 2004, China’s first Arctic research station was established in Ny Alesund, 
Svalbard, and in 2018, the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory began to operate at Karholl, near the town 
of Akureyri in northern Iceland. China’s first home-built icebreaker, Xuelong II, will be finished in 2019 – well 
                                                 
1 The two centenary goals were originally introduced by the then-President Jiang Zemin at the 15th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1997. However, the current president, Xi Jinping, elevated them to being China’s strategic 
priorities. They read as follows: 1) ‘doubling the 2010 GDP and per capita income of urban and rural residents and finishing 
the building of a society of initial prosperity in all respects’ and 2) ‘turning China into a modern socialist country that is 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious’ by 2049 (Xinhua 2014). 
before the United States even starts to build its new heavy icebreaker.2 In addition to scientific research, 
economic interests are today an important driver of China’s Arctic engagement. According to the U.S. 
Geological Survey (2008), the ‘extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest 
unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth’, and these resources clearly are of interest to 
China because of its growing hunger for oil, gas and other natural resources that are essential to its economy. To 
get access to those resources, the Chinese have increased cooperation with transnational corporations and the 
Arctic states – especially in Russia’s Yamal Peninsula, where Chinese partners take part in Yamal LNG, one of 
the largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the world. In addition, China ‘hopes to work with all parties to 
build a “Polar Silk Road” through developing the Arctic shipping routes’ (State Council Information Office of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2018). In particular, Russia’s Northern Sea Route is of special interest to China, 
as it makes it possible to ship LNG from Yamal to China and offers faster and shorter access to the European 
market.  
 
Growing strategic interests in the Arctic have also increased China’s desire to take part in the practices of Arctic 
regional governance. Being a non-Arctic state, however, China is not eligible to be a full member of the Arctic 
Council, the key regional forum established in 1996 to enhance cooperation and to coordinate interaction 
amongst the eight Arctic states and Arctic Indigenous communities on sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the region. Yet, China got the status of permanent observer in the Arctic Council in 
2013, which provides it access to the Council’s activities but no right to participate in decision-making. To 
increase its leverage in regional affairs, China has actively taken part in informal forums of Arctic governance, 
such as Arctic Frontiers in Tromso and the Arctic Circle in Reykjavik. Interestingly, two high-level Chinese 
representatives spoke at the opening session of the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2017 – while American 
representatives were conspicuous by their absence – and in 2018, the “China Night” event organised by the 
Chinese Embassy in Iceland “marked another highlight of the assembly” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC, 2018). Despite their historic tensions, China has also launched a new joint regional initiative with Japan 
and Korea, the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic, in which the Arctic states can only take part as 
observers. Moreover, China officially added the Arctic dimension to president Xi Jinping’s grand foreign policy 
initiative, One Belt, One Road, in June 2017 (Xinhua, 2017). China has also increased science diplomacy and 
bilateral cooperation with many Arctic states. For example, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center was 
established in 2013 and diplomatic relations with the Nordic countries are now promoted via the so-called 5+1 
diplomacy model (see Sverdrup-Thygeson, Lindgren & Lanteigne, 2018).  
 
In order to legitimise its growing role in the Arctic, China has started to cultivate an image of a ‘near-Arctic 
state’. According to China’s Arctic white paper, China is an ‘important stakeholder’ as well as an ‘active 
participant, builder and contributor in Arctic affairs who has spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom to the 
development of the Arctic region’ and who ‘commits itself to maintaining a peaceful, secure and stable Arctic 
order’ (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). When it comes to 
international peace and security, the white paper stresses that ‘Peace and stability in the Arctic… serves the 
fundamental interest of all countries including China’. Although the strategy describes China as a ‘responsible 
major country’, it does not otherwise make an explicit reference to China’s great power status nor to the related 
great power responsibilities. Yet, it hints that such responsibilities can be attached to China’s regional role: ‘As a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, China shoulders the important mission of jointly promoting 
peace and security in the Arctic’ (ibid.). In line with this, the white paper pledges to commit to existing 
international law and to respect the sovereign rights of the Arctic states as well as the interests of other states and 
the broader international society when promoting China’s own interests in the region. Overall, the Chinese 
government constantly underlines China’s benevolent role in international affairs, including the Arctic. As for 
environmental responsibilities, the Arctic white paper assures the world that ‘China always gives top priority to 
resolving global environmental issues, earnestly fulfills [sic] its obligations under relevant treaties, and 
discharges its responsibility of environmental protection’ (ibid.). 
                                                 
2 For further information on China’s (scientific) presence in the Arctic, see Brady (2017). 
 
While China does not assume great power responsibility in the Arctic, the Arctic white paper does not refer to 
great power rights, either. This comes as no surprise: such formulation would probably be viewed as threatening 
rhetoric by the Arctic states and would not support China’s pursuit to portray an image of a benevolent actor in 
the Arctic and beyond. Yet, the white paper makes it very clear that China, an external actor in the region, 
possesses international rights in the Arctic – and the Arctic states are to respect them. The strategy indeed argues 
for China’s rights to conduct scientific research, navigate, overfly, fish, lay submarine cables and pipelines as 
well as explore and exploit natural resources in the high seas, to name a few. To justify these international rights 
in the Arctic region clearly, the Chinese government has adopted a rhetoric strategy that highlights the global 
dimensions and transformation of the region. In particular, China’s Arctic white paper pays surprisingly little 
attention to the role of the Arctic Council in regional governance and describes the Arctic more or less as a 
global common. According to the white paper, the ‘Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic 
States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of 
the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development, and the shared future for 
mankind’ (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). In this way, China seems 
to pursue to advance a discursive shift from a territorial definition of the region towards a more globalised 
understanding of the region. If successful, this strategy is likely to alter the discourses on international security 
as well. 
 
China and climate security in the Arctic 
 
There is a scientific consensus on climate change being a real global problem exacerbated by human activities, 
especially by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil. Since greenhouse gas emissions do not respect 
borders of sovereign states but float throughout the atmosphere, climate change is a global problem that no 
individual nation-state can solve (or escape) on its own. Therefore, global cooperation and solutions are 
necessary. Since the early 1990s, international negotiations on climate change have been conducted under the 
UNFCCC. Owing to its position as the greatest carbon emitter and its status of an emerging great power, China 
now plays a gatekeeper’s role in those negotiations. As China’s contribution to the UNFCCC has been discussed 
elsewhere (e.g. Kopra, 2019a), in this chapter I will examine the ways in which China’s official statements 
regarding Arctic affairs conceptualize climate change. In particular, I elaborate on whether China’s Arctic 
policies and strategies address great power responsibility for climate change, and if so, how they are used to 
legitimate China’s role in the regional governance. 
 
At present, China’s carbon emissions account for about 30 percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions, 
which means that China is now the largest carbon emitter in the world. China seeks to halt its carbon emissions 
growth by 2030 but it remains unclear how much those emissions will grow before the peak. It seemed that the 
peak was reached between 2014 and 2016, but in 2017 the emissions rose again because of an increasing 
demand of coal, oil and gas (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). Furthermore, China is also a significant source of 
short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) – especially black carbon and methane – that are important contributors 
to climate change. Approximately 20 percent of the warming and snow-ice cover loss in the Arctic is attributed 
to the reduction of the albedo effect (i.e. Earth’s ability to reflect sunlight) caused by black carbon emissions 
(Koch et al. 2011). Yet, the international legal and governance regime steering the reduction of SLCPs in the 
Arctic is complex and fragmented (Yamineva & Kulovesi, 2018), and China’s air quality policies have not 
addressed black carbon per se, probably because of a lack of scientific knowledge on the substance and on the 
interconnections between air quality, public health and climate policies (Yamineva & Liu, 2019).   
 
In essence, China’s Arctic policy does not make any new contributions to international climate politics or efforts 
to reduce black carbon emissions. The white paper acknowledges that China’s emissions reduction measures 
have a ‘positive impact on the climatic and ecological environment of the Arctic’ but does not pledge China to 
enhance those actions. Since the strategy seems to take the legitimation of China’s Arctic engagement as its 
ultimate goal, it pays more attention to the nexus between China’s domestic climate security and Arctic climate 
change than to the state’s own contribution to the latter. That said, Arctic climate change undoubtedly is an 
important driver of China’s Arctic engagement, as recent scientific findings show that the melting of Arctic 
icecaps increases haze pollution in eastern China (Wang, Chen & Liu, 2015); causes flooding in many of 
China’s coastal mega-cities including Shanghai, Tianjin and Hong Kong; and alters many global natural 
processes that may hinder agricultural production in China. Air pollution and food security are of significant 
interest to the Chinese party-state because they have a great impact on social stability in the country and thereby 
on the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party itself.  Therefore, the Arctic white paper stresses the 
importance of scientific research on Arctic climate change and its global ramifications, and China wants to learn 
more about its domestic (security) implications. This knowledge may help improve its climate change adaptation 
plans, which is highly relevant from the viewpoint of Chinese leadership’s domestic responsibility, given the 
poor preparedness of the entire Chinese society to deal with risks posed by climate change (see China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2013). 
 
In terms of global climate leadership, however, China’s Arctic white paper misses a great opportunity to 
convince the world of the state’s commitment to climate change mitigation and to making climate responsibility 
an important attribute of great power responsibility. Since China is the greatest carbon emitter in the world, it is 
also the most significant contributor to Arctic climate change. When China’s Arctic white paper was published, 
an established (Arctic) great power, the United States, had abandoned the Paris climate agreement, making the 
future of international climate negotiations look rather grim. Since Russia as another Arctic great power has not 
showed much willingness to tackle climate change either, China could have rather easily elevated its profile in 
international society by introducing new, ambitious measures to mitigate climate change. At present, China’s 
nationally determined contribution to the UNFCCC3 is ‘highly insufficient’ to reach the goals of the Paris 
climate agreement unless other states increase their level of ambition (Climate Action Tracker, 2018).  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has made it very clear that to prevent the most dangerous 
climate change from happening, we must reduce the global net carbon emissions by 45 percent from the 2010 
level by 2030 (IPCC, 2018). Hence, all states should upgrade their climate mitigation pledges, as they are 
currently not sufficient to limit the global temperature rise to 2 °C, not to mention 1.5 °C that the IPPC defines as 
a safer upper limit to global warming. Like many other countries, China is not very eager to commit itself to 
quantitative emission reduction targets at a global level, since it would ‘lose face’ if it failed to meet them. 
Therefore, the bottom-up approach of the Paris climate agreement is particularly appealing to China. In political 
terms, however, China’s Arctic white paper could have shown global leadership by announcing new domestic 
measures to mitigate climate change for the protection of the Arctic. Such an announcement would have 
demonstrated that China has truly taken the driver’s seat in international climate politics. Besides, there are 
strong domestic incentives to decrease the use of coal, for instance, because of a growing discontent over 
environmental pollution amongst Chinese citizens. Moreover, such an announcement might have increased the 
willingness of the wider international community to recognize China as a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic 




Overall, Arctic engagement plays an important role in China’s efforts to become an established great power in 
terms of economy, technology, knowledge and policy. Although China is a non-Arctic state, it has found ways to 
increase its leverage in the domains of economy, science diplomacy and bilateral cooperation with several Arctic 
states, especially Russia and the Nordic countries. As China’s military and technological capabilities have been 
discussed in previous literature, I chose not to discuss the material aspects of China’s great power status in this 
                                                 
3 China’s current nationally determined contribution to the UNFCCC reads as follows: a) To achieve the peaking of carbon 
dioxide emissions around 2030 and making best efforts to peak early; b) To lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP 
by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level; c) To increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
20%; and d) To increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level (China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2015). 
chapter. Instead, I focused on China’s great power identity and corresponding notions of responsibility in the 
Arctic in general, and climate responsibility in particular. Climate change is indeed a central issue in view of 
China’s increasing role in the Arctic: China argues that because of the adverse effects of climate change, it has 
special interests in the Arctic and must therefore have a chance to engage in Arctic governance. In other words, 
China uses climate change as a key justification for its Arctic engagement.  
 
There is a growing consensus in international society that climate change is a threat in terms of both traditional 
and non-traditional definitions of security. From the viewpoint of English School theory, it means that great 
powers must shoulder a special responsibility in responding to climate change. Although China has sought to 
define climate responsibility as an attribute of great power responsibility at a global level (Kopra, 2019a), its 
Arctic policy makes no reference to this special responsibility nor demonstrates any kind of leadership in global 
efforts to tackle climate change – an omission very critical to international (climate) security. Under the 
presidency of Donald Trump, the United States has also failed to live up to its great power climate responsibility. 
If the next U.S. president does not renew American great power leadership in international climate politics, 
China’s emerging climate leadership becomes even more critical in the future. For China, there are strong 
domestic incentives to take the findings of the IPCC (2018) seriously. In addition to national security interests, 
the “greenification” of economy supports China’s structural reforms and development plans. Thus, taking a 
stronger leadership role in international climate politics would probably not be a big sacrifice for China. 
Conversely, such a leadership role would significantly improve its status as a responsible great power – a status 
that would bring along privileges in international society, perhaps including more room to manoeuvre in the 
Arctic. Since notions of great power responsibility derive from practices of security politics, however, it is not 
very likely that either China or the United States will assume a strong climate leadership role without a profound 
transformation in the discourses and premises of international security. What we need, hence, is a paradigm shift 
in international security: climate change must be identified as a key security threat of our times. In practice, it 
would mean that great powers are no longer able to carry out their special responsibility to maintain international 
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